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Towards a Social Externalism
Pragmatism and Ethnomethodology
Louis Quéré
1 Ethnomethodologists have long held an ambivalent attitude towards pragmatism, and
especially towards George Herbert Mead, the most widely-read pragmatist author in the
social sciences. On the one hand, they have seen in Mead’s work a precursor of the type of
analysis that they have later referred to as “Mind in Action,” to take up the title of a not-
so-recent book by Jeff Coulter (1989). On the other hand, they consider that Mead never
entirely broke from a Cartesian conception of the mind, and has not managed to provide
a correct analysis of the concept of “mentality.” However, these positions are evolving, as
proven  by  a  recent  paper  by  Mustapha Emirbayer  and  Doug  Maynard  in  Qualitative
Sociology (Emirbayer  &  Maynard  2011).  While  ethnomethodology  is  in  a  position  to
provide an effective set of tools for pragmatism’s radical empiricism, the latter can, in the
field of  social-scientific  inquiry,  allow ethnomethodology to be something more than
simply  a  further  program for  the  study  of  social  interaction  and  spare  it  from the
technical tendencies that presently threaten it.1
2 In what follows I will not tackle a subject as vast as this. I will simply attempt to shed light
on an analytic orientation of ethnomethodology that it seems to share with pragmatism,
which I propose to call “social externalism.” In order to do this, I will begin by discussing
a critique of Mead’s work by the ethnomethodologists Jeff Coulter and Rod Watson, which
does not seem to me to do full justice to Mead’s externalism. I will then go on to explain
and highlight the social dimension of this externalism and compare it to that of Harold
Garfinkel, the founder of ethnomethodology.
 
Mead’s Vulnerability
3 In their introductory article for a recent issue of Theory, Culture and Society on cognitivism,
Jeff  Coulter  and  Rod  Watson  (2008)  criticize  researchers  who  treat  our  “mental
vocabulary” as if it provided labels for inner, un-observable phenomena (states of mind,
activities,  processes,  etc.),  and  those  who  view  “normative  practices”  such  as
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interpreting, anticipating, and controlling as if they were operations or processes which
are analyzable independently from their relation to the specific context by which they
are  occasioned.  Drawing support  from Wittgenstein’s  philosophy of  psychology,  they
recall that mental predicates are not names for processes in the mind or the brain, but
person-level predicates. It is persons, and not parts that are internal to them such as the
brain or the mind, who think, reason, understand, intend, etc. Furthermore, introducing
categories such as ‘act,’ ‘activity,’ ‘process,’ and ‘experience’ in order to account for these
mental predicates takes us down the wrong path from the very beginning, because these
are not the appropriate categories. Thus, “to understand” is not a verb of activity but of
ability. In the same way, talking about the ‘mind’ is equivalent to talking about various
human  capacities  and  their  exercise,  which  are  observable,  and  especially  about
capacities  which  enable  self-consciousness  and  self-reflection  (see  Bennett  &  Hacker
2003).
Once  we  manage  to  expurgate  the  mentalistic  characterization  of  much  of  our
vocabulary of personal predication, we can begin then truly to grasp how it actually
works.  In  cases  where  we  can  tell  (e.g.)  what  someone  thinks,  how  he  has
understood something, what he intends to do or what his motive is, we do so on the
basis of scenic criteria of conduct and circumstances. In those cases in everyday life
where we cannot tell what someone thinks, etc., we need, not access to anything
“inner,” but rather, as Wittgenstein reminds us, to “more of the outer.” (Watson &
Coulter 2008: 13)
4 In passing,  Coulter and Watson attack Herbert Blumer,  whose symbolic interactionist
program, inspired by Mead, seems to them to be based upon a mentalist conception of
human behavior, as suggested by the following quotation from Blumer’s book.
 
Symbolic Interactionism 
5 The  term  “symbolic  interaction”  refers,  of  course,  to  the  peculiar  and  distinctive
character of interaction as it takes place between human beings. The peculiarity consists
in the fact that human beings interpret or “define” each other’s actions. Their “response”
is not made directly to the actions of one another but instead is based on the meaning
which they attach to such actions. Thus, human interaction is mediated by the use of
symbols, by interpretation, or by ascertaining the meaning of one another’s actions. This
mediation is equivalent to inserting a process of interpretation between stimulus and
response in the case of human behavior (Blumer, 1967: 78-9).
6 To introduce in this way an interpretation, qua mental operation, as a mediator of action
is  a  problematic  move,  as  is  inserting  an  interpretation  of  the  rule  into  the  act  of
following that rule, as Wittgenstein has shown.
7 However, for Coulter and Watson, the problem stems not only from Blumer’s subjectivist
and mentalist interpretation of Mead, but also from Mead himself:
Mead did much to open up “mind” to the warp and weft of ordinary social practice,
and  certainly  made  important  moves  towards  the  position  whereby  mind  was
conceived  praxiologically,  in  terms  of  its  publicity  and  transparency  in  action
rather  than  in  terms  of  its  “privacy,”  “interiority”  or  “indwelling”  within
individuals. He did, however, on occasion, continue to conceive of mind in the latter
terms: again, his position is not entirely stabilized. Not only is there a continuing
concern in his work with evolved biological bases, but also with a psychological
interiority. Thus he wrote of an “inner conversation” or “inner dialogue” between
the “I” and the “Me,” of “Self-indication,” the imaginative “taking the role of the
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other” […] We see here in Mead’s work […] a range of problems attendant upon the
failure to entirely abolish the internal-external distinction with regard to mind.
(Watson & Coulter 2008: 7-8)
8 Is  this  diagnosis  correct?  Mead  unquestionably  made  abundant  use  of  the  internal/
external distinction. But did he do so in order to uphold a mentalist conception of the
mind?  Unquestionably,  he  conceived  of  thought  as  an  inner  conversation.  But  is  it
between the I and the Me, and is it to explain behavior in terms of some “psychological
interiority”? For example, in his theory of the act, Mead distinguished between an “inner
phase” and an “external phase” of behavior, and indeed, he did not resist the temptation
to anchor the former in the brain. But did he conceive of the act as being controlled from
the inside by some subjectivity? Finally, does he see the adoption of another’s attitude as
an operation of the imagination?
9 Unquestionably, Mead’s position on these issues is far from being clear and stable in all
its points. For example, when he defines thought as an “inner conversation,” he presents
thinking as talking to oneself while assuming the role of the other, or of the community
as a whole. In doing this, he fails to analyze the phenomenon properly: thinking is not
‘talking’ to oneself, we do not need to talk to ourselves when we think; however, we can
only think what we can also express in words or through other media (for  example
through art). But this is not the center of Mead’s argument. His main idea is that thought,
like reflective intelligence, results from the internalization of a mechanism of organizing
behavior  which  is  situated  in  the  social  process  as  a  whole,  more  particularly  in
communication, and not in the individual’s psychological interior. It is the mechanism of
assuming the attitudes of others,  those of the “generalized other” or of the common
perspective,  in  the  coordination  of  acts,  gestures,  and  words.  These,  then,  are  the
processes of an “external social organism” that lend their structure to human thought.
Furthermore,  contrary  to  the  assumption  of  Coulter  and  Watson,  adopting  others’
attitudes is not taken as an operation of the imagination, because in Mead’s conception,
this process is anterior to the emergence of thought and imagination. It is this process
that permits the development of the ‘self’ and the ‘mind.’ The questions that we may well
ask, however, when confronted with this kind of explanation are these: Should we trace
our mental capabilities, which involve the mastery of techniques, back to mechanisms?
Furthermore, doesn’t Mead introduce, in his theoretical explanations, shadowy entities
that often just push back the problems that they are supposed to solve? 
10 The same difficulties arise in the analysis of ‘self-consciousness,’ a problem that haunted
Mead throughout his life. Being self-conscious does not imply being conscious of one’s
‘self’ as a carrier, subject, or owner of the experience. Neither does it mean to dispose of
an image or concept of oneself. These are interpretations that Mead rules out from the
very beginning. Rather, it means to respond to one’s “generalized habitual responses,” or
to the attitudes and impulses on which they depend, which means being conscious of the
fact of standing ready to react in a such and such a way to such and such a stimulus. But
the idea of self-consciousness remains ambiguous, and to consider, as Mead seems to do,
that  self-consciousness  can  arise  before  language  has  been  acquired,  presents  some
difficulties.  Indeed,  according  to  Mead,  the  individual  acquires  a  first  form  of  self-
consciousness  as  soon  as  the  self  appears  in  its  experience  as  a  conduct-organizing
mechanism. The individual acquires a self when relating and reacting to himself as if it
were an object in the environment, via the mechanisms of self-affection (affecting oneself
through gestures that are addressed to others) and via the assumption of the attitude of
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the other. This explanation still  seems to be entirely informed by the notion of ‘self-
reflection.’
11 In the following I would like to accomplish two tasks. The first is to correct Coulter and
Watson’s  interpretation  of  Mead’s  supposed  “internalism,”  and  the  second  is  to
reestablish  links  between  Mead’s  thought  and  ethnomethodology.  Too  often,
ethnomethodologists  have identified Mead with Blumer and symbolic  interactionism,
which they struggled against, usually with good reason. However, they have not done
justice to Mead’s work, and have thus closed themselves off from certain insights, for
example concerning the nature of the social act or the primacy of the social process – two




12 Coulter and Watson are right to underline the pregnancy of Mead’s distinction between
‘internal’ and ‘external,’ as well as its ambiguities. However, what they don’t notice is that
Mead’s “internalism” is a crucial component of his “externalism” and a centerpiece of his
“social behaviorism,” which makes it all the more significant. This is very apparent in his
analysis of the internal and external phases of the act.
13 Mead’s starting point is a criticism of John B. Watson’s behaviorist psychology. His main
criticism is that Watsonian behaviorism makes an important part of the act disappear
under the pretext that it is not observable, and psychologizes it in order to get rid of it.
What Watson causes to disappear is the “internal phase” of the act. For Mead, however,
this phase is  not psychological,  although it  happens inside of  the organism: it  is  not
different in nature from the external phase. In short, Mead proposes to consider the act
in its entirety, and to show how most external, observable processes are prepared in the
organism, or rather how they originate in the organism:
What the behaviorist does, or ought to do, is to take the complete act, the whole
process of conduct, as the unit of conduct. In doing that he has to take into account
not simply the nervous system but also the rest of the organism. (Mead, 1934: 111)
14 There are multiple aspects to the Meadian problem of the “complete act.” At least four
can be discerned. The first concerns the distribution of the act over the interior and
exterior of the organism. The second aspect is the role played by the interruption of the
act – which is not completed – in perception and in the emergence of thought, reflection,
and  choice  as  means  of  controlling  behavior.  The  third  aspect  corresponds  to  the
distribution of the social act among multiple agents, and the fourth to the participation of
objects, especially physical objects, in the completion of the act. (In order for an act to be
successfully completed, the “resistance of things” is necessary, which resistance involves
an activity in the object which is of the same nature as the one that takes place in the
organism. The organism produces the response in the object that its act tends to call up,
and adopts its attitude in order to produce its own future responses to the object).
15 It is necessary to first deal with the possible misinterpretations of the terms ‘act’ and
‘internal  phase.’  ‘Act’  calls  to  mind  a  punctual  event.  When  we  speak  of  an  act,  it
generally means that we have converted a course of action or an activity, which is an
event including other events, into an object of thought, which is discursive in nature –
“an event-with-meanings,” as Dewey would say.  Yet for Mead,  as for all  pragmatists,
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experience is not structured by discourse; it is not primarily cognitive/discursive, but
“behavioral,” that is it is a matter of conduct or behavior in an environment. An act is
also 
an ongoing event that consists of stimulation and response and the results of the
response. Back of these lie the attitudes and impulses of the individual which are
responsible for his sensitiveness to the particular stimulus and for the adequacy of
the response. (Mead 1938: 364)
16 It is in the act that the relation between organism and environment, as well as the nature
of their transactions, are determined.
17 In addition, the expression ‘internal phase’ of the act makes us think spontaneously of
anything that motivates and directs the act, and which is usually situated in the category
of the ‘mental’ or ‘states of mind’ – from beliefs, desires, intentions and volitions, through
ideas,  images,  reasoning,  exploration  and  deliberation,  to  consciousness  and  self-
consciousness. This is not at all what Mead situates in the internal phase of the act. He
does not include intentions and volitions, consciousness and reflection, reasoning and
deliberation. In fact, for him, even in immediate experience – that is to say experience
that does not involve consciousness, thought, or reflection – the act necessarily also has
an internal phase.
18 Of course there are processes in the organism which take place in the “central nervous
system” and which are not observable. However, if they are supports, those processes are
not on the same level as that which constitutes the matter of the internal phase of the
act. The latter can be called psychological, but only in a very limited sense of that term:
The psychological datum is best defined, therefore, in terms of accessibility. That
which  is  accessible,  in  the  experience  of  the  individual,  only  to  the  individual
himself, is peculiarly psychological. I want to point out, however, that even when
we come to the discussion of such “inner” experience, we can approach it from the
point of view of the behavior, provided that we do not too narrowly conceive this
point of view. What one must insist upon is that objectively observable behavior
finds expression within the individual, not in the sense of being in another world, a
subjective world, but in the sense of being within his organism. (Mead, 1934: 5)
19 So  what  are  we  dealing  with,  if  it  is  neither  psychological  states  or  events,  nor
neurophysiological processes? How to conceive the “internal phase” of the act without
making it either something mental or subjective, or something purely psychological? The
answer can be found in the passage that follows the previous quotation:
Something  of  this  [objectively  observable]  behavior  appears  in  what  we  term
“attitudes,” the beginning of acts. Now, if we come back to such attitudes we find
them giving rise to all sorts of responses. The telescope in the hands of a novice is
not a telescope in the sense that it is to those on top of Mount Wilson. If we want to
trace the responses of the astronomer, we have to go back into his central nervous
system,  back  to  a  whole  series  of  neurons;  and  we  find  something  there  that
answers  to  the  exact  way  in  which  the  astronomer  approaches  the  instrument
under certain conditions. That is the beginning of the act; it is a part of the act. The
external act which we do observe is a part of the process which has started within;
the values which we say the instrument has are values through the relationship of
the object to the pers0n who has that sort of attitude. (Ibid.: 5)
20 This passage reveals a recurrent and very problematic confusion in Mead’s writing, which
has been pointed out very accurately by Coulter and Watson. Mead equates what is going
on in the organism to what is going on in the “central nervous system,” and places the
organization of the act in the latter. While it is undeniable that the act in its totality
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involves neural processes, it is obvious that Mead is trying to describe something other
than these when talking about the “internal phase” of the act. The description of this
phase requires  a  different  vocabulary,  as  is  shown by the usage of  concepts  such as
‘attitude,’ which does not pertain to the vocabulary of neurophysiology. While attitude is
not a neurophysiological process,  it  is not a psychological state either.  The nature of
attitude is “behavioral,” because attitude is the beginning of an act. To assume a certain
attitude therefore means to be poised to act in a certain way, to be poised to do various
things, or to execute various acts, or parts of acts, in relation to objects that are to be
handled, or when confronted with situations to resolve. We thus order and arrange the
various awakened attitudes in a way so that they do not conflict with each other. An
attitude  is  not  observable  the  way a  concrete  behavior  is,  but  if  the attitude  is  the
beginning of an act, which determines what will follow after what immediately happens,
the attitude, as it is present in behavior, is of the same nature as observable conduct. 
21 Mead offers various examples to illustrate what he means by ‘attitude’ and “beginning of
an act.” One of these is the previous example of the astronomer on Mount Wilson who,
when approaching the telescope, is poised to act very differently than the novice who has
not yet acquired the skills to use the instrument properly. Another example appearing in
many of Mead’s writings is the example of the hammer:
If one approaches a distant object he approaches it with reference to what he is
going to do when he arrives there. If one approaches a hammer he is muscularly all
ready to seize the handle of the hammer. The later stages of the act are present in
the early stages – not simply in the sense that they are all ready to go off, but in the
sense that  they serve to control  the process  itself.  They determine how we are
going to approach the object, and the steps in our early manipulation of it. […] The
act as a whole can be there determining the process. (Ibid.: 11)
22 The same example is taken up again in Philosophy of the Act in order to illustrate what an
attitude is (unfortunately, with the same tendency to associate it with the brain):
Thus in reaching a hammer we already have in the organism the attitude of striking
with the hammer. If now there are present in the experience not only the visual
stimulus to reach for the object but also the characters of the object which initiate
the response of striking with the object, we have excited those nervous elements
which are responsible for the beginning of this later act in its co-ordination with
the earlier phase of reaching for the object. Also there enters into the experience
what is called the imagery of the result of the response. We feel the hardness of the
hammer handle and something of its balance in the hand before we actually get it
into the hand. (Mead 1938: 130)
23 Assuming  an  attitude  means  to  initiate  a  movement,  to  begin  an  act  while  tacitly
projecting its  totality,  especially  its  last  phases,  its  final  point,  and to  use  this  tacit
projection  in  order  to  control  the  accomplishment  of  the  gestures.  ‘Attitude,’  as
conceived  by  Mead,  thus  presents  the  characteristics  of  projection,  operativity,  and
effectiveness,  which  Dewey,  in  Human  Nature  and  Conduct,  attributes  to  ‘habit.’  The
attitude  can  take  various  forms,  notably  include  ideas,  under  the  condition  that  a
pragmatic definition of the idea is adopted. This is what Mead explains in one of his last
published texts, “A pragmatist theory of truth”:
Symbols  are in truth the appropriate  stimuli  of  our attitudes.  Attitudes are the
responses which are present in our behavior either in advance of the stimulation of
things, or, already aroused, yet await the occasion for their full expression. In the
first  case they may appear as ideas or concepts,  in the second as the meanings
which constitute things.  The concept of  a  book is  the organization of  attitudes,
which, given the stimulus, will express themselves in reading, writing, borrowing,
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drawing, buying or selling the book. They are all there in the dispositions of men, as
forms of conduct which await the appropriate spring to call them out. (Mead 1929:
336)
24 Four observations can be made about this  citation.  First,  this  time,  the attitudes are
located in conduct, and not in the central nervous system. Second, there is a plurality of
attitudes:  we are poised to act in different ways, to do a series of things, to produce
various responses in relation to an object – this preparation is included in every phase of
the various acts. A selection is therefore necessary. Third, there is a difference between
attitudes and effective responses: the latter are manifest, while the former are not; it is
necessary to select stimuli in order to pass from the former to the latter. Finally, the
fourth  observation  concerns  the  assimilation  of  ideas,  concepts  and  significations/
meanings into habitual responses to an object and into dispositions to act in different
ways towards it. Ideas enter into conscious experience in the form of organized attitudes
to which the organism responds, that is to say
as attitudes or organized responses selecting characters of things when they can be
detached from the  situations  within  which  they  take  place.  Particularly  do  our
habitual responses to familiar objects constitute for us the ideas of these objects.
(Mead 1932: 97)
25 This is why ideas constitute an important part of the human environment. 
26 Where does this lead us? Mead’s internalism appears as the centerpiece of the behaviorist
psychology that Mead sought to set in opposition to that of Watson. As we have seen, this
internalism has its ambiguities, especially when it comes to simultaneously using two
mutually  untranslatable  vocabularies:  that  of  the  description  of  action  in  ordinary
language, which is the basis of the concept of attitude, even in its redefined form; and
that  of  neurophysiology.  It  is  possible  to  partially  dissolve  these  ambiguities  if  we
reformulate Mead’s intuitions from a more phenomenological perspective: what Mead
discovers in his analysis of the internal phase of the act are the phenomenon of “motor
intentionality” and the projection capabilities of the lived body (“corps propre”),  and
here especially the way in which the body actively addresses itself to objects and events.
From this point of view, a number of Mead’s intuitions actually anticipate those that
Merleau-Ponty would later develop in his analysis of the dynamism of the body, as has
sometimes  been  noted.  Far  from designating  neural  processes  alone,  this  dynamism
involves an original intentionality, namely motricity, which gives things a motor meaning
and  generates  a  type  of  practical  knowledge  that  Merleau-Ponty  calls  praktognosie
(‘practognosis’). The goal of Mead’s reflection is to bring out this dynamism of the body
and this form of intentionality in the analysis of the act. Of special importance is the
inclusion of a kind of non-representational projection of the act in its entirety which
allows  the  control  of  its  progressive  accomplishment  (on  this  subject  see  Joas  1996,
Chapter 3).
 
Is “Taking The Role of The Other” Imaginative?
27 A second correction of Coulter and Watson’s proposition seems necessary: to talk of “the
imaginative ‘taking the role of the other’” suggests that Mead has the imagination acting
as a mediator of interaction and communication, just as Blumer has interpretation acting
as mediator of the organization of behavior. Here, too, Mead’s way of putting things is a
source of confusion, as could be seen in one of the citations above, where he includes “the
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imagery of the results of the response” as a component of the attitude. But if, as Mead
postulates, the mechanism of adoption of another’s attitude is located in behavior, it does
not possess the mental character that it would possess if it required imagination. This
mechanism appears well before the emergence of mental processes. 
28 For Mead, this mechanism has its origin in a very early phase of social communication: he
supposes that vocal gestures arose within the conversation of gestures. In his theory, it is
thanks to the vocal gesture, through which the utterer affects himself in the same way
that he affects the recipient, that individuals are able to begin reacting to their own acts
just as recipients react, to stimulate themselves while also stimulating the other, and to
project  into  their  environment  their  own  tendencies  to  respond  or  their  organized
responses.  From  the  moment  when  the  responses  provoked  from  both  sides  have
converged, the conversation of gestures was able to advance to a level where the gestures
acquire a shared meaning. In Mead’s conception these processes are anything but mental:
the conversation of gestures can do without representation, reflection, and imagination.
The explanation for this is similar to that given in the case of attitudes. A gesture is the
beginning of an act that calls for and indicates a possible continuation in another gesture,
the second responding to the first by projecting the accomplishment of the act, as well as
its result. As soon as a gesture indicates to someone how to continue, this gesture has
meaning, which in turn is provided by the response that interprets it in the form of an
act.
29 Here is how Mead explains the objective nature and threefold character of meaning:
Meaning is […] a development of something objectively there as a relation between
certain phases of the social act; it is not a psychical addition to that act and it is not
an “idea” as traditionally conceived. A gesture by an organism, the resultant of the
social act in which the gesture is an early phase, and the responses of the organism
to the gesture, are the relata in a triple or threefold relationship of gesture to the
first organism, of gesture to second organism and of gesture to subsequent phases
of the given act; and this threefold relationship constitutes the matrix within which
meaning arises, or which develops into the field of meaning. (Mead 1934: 76)
30 As shown here, nothing indicates that Mead considers the assumption of the attitude of
the other as a mental phenomenon which requires imagination, much to the contrary: 
I think it can be shown that selves do belong to [an objective phase of experience
which we set  off  against  a  psychical  phase]  […],  which we distinguish from our
imaginations and our ideas, that is, from what we term psychical. The evidence for
this  is  found in the fact  that  the human organism,  in  advance of  the psychical
experiences  to  which  Cooley  refers,  assumes  the  attitude  of  another  which  it
addresses by vocal gesture, and in this attitude addresses itself, thus giving rise to
its own self and to the other. (Mead 1930a: 704)
31 This “operation” takes place in behavior,  more precisely in communication,  which is
partly a social process. It is in communication where society, selves, minds, and what
Mead calls the “psychical,” come into existence:
In the process of communication there appears a social world of selves standing on
the same level of immediate reality as that of the physical world that surrounds us.
It  is  out  of  this  social  world  that  the  inner  experiences  arise  which  we  term
psychical, and they serve largely in interpretation of this social world as psychical
sensations and percepts serve to interpret the physical objects of our environment.
(Ibid.)
32 In an earlier text Mead evokes two major phases in the development of communication:
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Communication is  a social  process whose natural  history shows that it  arises of
cooperative activities, such as those involved in sex, parenthood, fighting, herding,
and the like, in which some phase of the act of the form, which may be called a
gesture, acts as stimulus to others to carry on their parts of the social act. It does
not become communication in the full sense, i.e., the stimulus does not become a
significant  symbol,  until  the  gesture  tends  to  arouse  the  same  response  in  the
individual who makes it that it arouses in the others. The history of the growth of
language shows that in its earlier stages the vocal gestures addressed to another
awakens in the individual who makes the gesture not simply the tendency to the
response which it calls forth in the other, such as the seizing of a weapon or the
avoiding of a danger,  but primarily the social  role which the other plays in the
cooperative act. (Mead 1927: 76)
33 Here  we  witness  the  appearance  of  the  “social  role,”  a  term Mead used  frequently.
However, he does not distinguish between “taking on the role of the other” and assuming
his attitude. This is why, in addition to the many undesirable connotations of the concept
of role in sociology, it is preferable to use the second expression. Assuming the attitude of
the other means activating in one’s behavior a tendency to respond to a certain kind of
stimulus as the other would respond. Gary A. Cook reminds us that Mead considers this
“operation” to be very productive:
(1) it underlies the acquisition of significant symbols; (2) it makes possible the inner
dialogue of human thought; (3) it is the behavioral mechanism by means of which
the individual achieves self-consciousness; (4) it is responsible for the development
of the social structure of the human self or personality; (5) it provides the principle
of distinctively human social organization; (6) it enables the human individual to
participate  in  a  world  of  public  or  shared  objects;  (7)  it  is  responsible  for  our
everyday perceptual experience of distant objects as entities having “insides” and
as existing contemporaneously with those objects that are within our grasp; (8) it
yields the capacity to occupy and compare in thought different spatio-temporal
perspectives. (Cook 1993: 92)
34 If Coulter and Watson’s judgment on Mead’s errors is therefore in part justified, it still
does  not  do  justice  to  Mead’s  externalism,  a  component  of  which  is  the  motor
intentionality of the body. Mead often underlined the corporeal character of the selves,
and gave an important place to contact and touch in his theory of perception. However he
never extended his analysis of the internal phase of the act to an explanation of the
nature of the relation of the lived body (“corps propre”) to the world, maybe because of
his tendency as a psychologist to place the organization of conduct in the central nervous
system.
 
The Sense of “Normality” as Common Perspective
35 I will now focus on pointing out the social character of Mead’s externalism, the central
idea of which is that the self, the mind, the mental and self-consciousness are given rise
to  by  the  social  process.  As  this  social  externalism  is  also  an  essential  aspect  of
ethnomethodological “doctrine,” it seems pertinent to bring the approaches of Garfinkel
and Mead into perspective – not,  however, without taking certain precautions. In his
early writings, Garfinkel defined his externalism in the following terms:
I shall exercise a theorist’s preference and say that meaningful events are entirely
and exclusively events in a person’s behavioral environment, with this defined in
accordance with Hallowell’s usage. Hence there is no reason to look under the skull
since nothing of interest is to be found there but brains. The “skin” of the person
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will be left intact. Instead questions will be confined to the operations that can be
performed upon events that are “scenic” to the person. (Garfinkel 1963: 190)
36 If there is one point where Mead and the ethnomethodological approach converge, it is in
the  affirmation of  the  primacy  of  society  and the  fundamentally  social  character  of
human conduct (the logical order of Mead’s argument is: Society, Self and Mind, and not
the reverse). Coulter and Watson base their critique on a Wittgensteinian interpretation
of  ethnomethodology,  which  focuses  on  dissipating  conceptual  ambiguities  and  on
correcting category errors that underlie questioning and analysis in the humanities and
social sciences, notably as concerns the study of mind and cognition, and the use of a
“mental  vocabulary.” It  must be admitted that,  viewed from this perspective,  Mead’s
undertaking seems eminently vulnerable in multiple respects.
37 However, while justified, a Wittgensteinian reading of ethnomethodology is not the only
conceivable reading. It is also possible to consider that ethnomethodology has indirectly
reformulated  certain  of  Mead’s  intuitions,  rendering  them  more  plausible  and
transforming them into objects of empirical study. I say “indirectly” because Garfinkel, if
he read Mead at all, did not reference him – much to the contrary. Initially, Garfinkel
attempted to find a solution to problems that he found in Parsons’ action theory, while
drawing on insights from various phenomenological  perspectives (Husserl,  Gurwitsch,
Schütz, Merleau-Ponty).
38 From  Garfinkel’s  point  of  view,  the  Meadian  enterprise  seems  without  a  doubt  an
immense but unjustified theoretical construction, populated with ghostly entities and
processes that were produced by a fertile imagination but that are ultimately incapable of
describing social phenomena in their radical concreteness. Garfinkel’s objective is neither
to naturalize the mind, the senses, or the form of social organization that we live in, nor
to explain the formation of self-consciousness. He thus stands much closer to William
James  than  to  Mead,  especially  when  explaining  why  it  is  necessary  to  avoid  the
venerated practices of theorization, establishing models and constructing ‘ideal types,’ or
when criticizing the substitution of concrete phenomena with abstract, imagined entities
when trying to talk about them. Nevertheless, Garfinkel tacitly takes up and reformulates
a number of Mead’s intuitions, for example when describing the functioning of practical
reasoning  or  of  common  sense  knowledge  of  social  structures.  This  is  not  entirely
surprising when one considers that he had initially been influenced by Alfred Schütz, who
had incorporated various pragmatist analyses into his social phenomenology. Garfinkel
neither talks about assuming the attitude of a generalized other, nor about adopting the
common perspective, but he describes similar processes when explaining the functioning
of the ordinary grasping of events, when describing the role of reference to normality in
common-sense judgments,  or  when describing the functioning of  Durkheimian social
objects. 
39 There exists, in the ordinary grasping of objects and events in the environment, or in the
ordinary  grasping  of  situations,  as  Garfinkel  describes  it,  an  adjustment  to  the
anonymous point of view of “everyone,” without this being the bringing into play of an
underlying mechanism of attitude assumption. Relying on Schütz, Garfinkel shows that
the  condition  for  an  event  to  belong  to  a  “known-in-the-manner-of-common-sense-
environment” is that “its features are not assigned as matters of personal preference but
are to be seen by anyone” (Garfinkel 1967: 56) (the “are to be seen” designating a quasi-
moral obligation). In addition to “the determinations” attributed to the event (and to the
immediate reactions that it evokes), the preferences, expectations, orientations, or values
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offended by the event, required as a matter of “objective necessity,” are considered as
attributable to everyone who is a “bona fide member” of the same community of language
and  practices.  Therefore,  the  reactions  that  the  event  evokes  are  endowed  with  a
character of normality, and thereby also with a character of obligation. 
40 For Garfinkel, the sense of normality designates the form that the social perspective takes
in the organization of conduct. “Sense of normality” is to be read not only as the way that
things usually happen in relations and in the factual dimension of social life, but also as a
sense of how things should and must happen (the normative and axiological dimension).
In  particular,  the  sense  of  normality  with  regard  to  situations,  practices  and  social
relations  comprises  a  moral  sense  of  the  reasons  for  facts,  norms,  and  values  that
underlie this normality, that is to say a sense of how they are justified. It is therefore tied
closely to a determinate conception of the social and moral order. This sense of normality
and the corresponding vision of social and moral order are at the same time prescriptive
and hermeneutic: they are prescriptive in the sense that they establish obligations; they
are hermeneutic insofar as they serve to identify and interpret reality.
41 This sense of normality implies that conduct and practices are animated and directed by
ideas, conceptions and beliefs – after all, people understand at least a minimum of what
they are doing and what they see others do, and this understanding involves ideas, or
more precisely a particular type of ideas, namely anonymous and impersonal ideas that
pertain to practices and social institutions. It is precisely because certain impersonal ideas
are  constitutive  of  practices  and  institutions  that  these  ones  make  sense  for  their
“members.” C. Castoriadis and C. Taylor call this the “social imaginary.” While Garfinkel
does not use the term “social imaginary,” what he describes as “a legitimate order of
beliefs  about  life  in  society  seen  ‘from  within’  the  society”  (Garfinkel  1967:  54)
corresponds quite well to Castoriadis and Taylor’s expression.
42 Building on Schütz’s analytical sketches of the structures of the Lebenswelt, and especially
on  the  opposition  that  he  established  between  the  “attitude  of  daily  life”  and  the
“attitude of scientific theorizing,” Garfinkel described the functioning of the sense of
normality  in  a  relatively  precise  manner  in  chapters  2,  3  and  5  of  Studies  in
ethnomethodology. For the ordinary man, the social and moral order primarily manifests
itself  in  the  normal  character  of  situations  of  everyday  life,  that  is  to  say  in  their
conformity to normative background expectations and legitimate beliefs about social life.
Where we find order, we find behavior appearing as familiar forms that are normatively
expected and identifiable for what they are, because they are endowed with organization,
they are standardized, and they correspond to what everyone could or would do under
the same circumstances, and so on. From this point of view, members don’t meet society
as an object of thought – as a represented or imagined order, a conceptualized totality, a
personality  of  higher  hierarchical  order,  or  as  a  discursively  asserted  collectivity  of
belonging – but, much more prosaically, as the standardized, reproducible and normal
character of concrete figures drawn in conduct and in activities of ordinary scenes of
social  life.  The “normality,”  which cannot  be  grasped from outside  of  a  situation of
committment,  is  therefore essentially a morally motivated conformity to an assumed
order which is defined by mores and institutions, habits and customs: “For the bona fide
member  ‘normal’  means  ‘in  accordance  with  the  mores’.”  Normality  functions
simultaneously  as  an  interpretive  pattern,  as  the  content of  normative  background
expectations, as guide when configuring behavior (in production as well as in reception),
as regulator of social affects, and as a linchpin for the construction of justifications.
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43 Here is  how Garfinkel  introduces this  perspective in chapter 2 of  his  work,  which is
devoted to the routines of everyday life:
A society’s members encounter and know the moral order as perceivedly normal
courses of action – familiar scenes of everyday affairs, the world of daily life known
in common with others and with others taken for granted. 
They refer to this world as the “the natural facts of life” which, for members, are
through and through moral facts of life. For members not only are matters so about
familiar scenes, but they are so because it is morally right or wrong that they are
so. Familiar scenes of everyday activities, treated by members as “the natural facts
of life,” are massive facts of the members’ daily existence both as a real world and
as the product of activities in a real world. (Garfinkel 1967: 35)
44 In the organization of their activities and exchanges social actors shape their conduct
according to the constitutive expectations of the “attitude of everyday life” as a morality.
The “attitude of  everyday life” pertains to “morality” insofar as it  implies a morally
motivated adherence to the “natural facts of life in society,” that is to say, an adherence
to current  beliefs,  mores,  habits,  and customs.  This  is  why it  is  possible  to  say that
members of society act and interact in a situation of commitment. Their commitment is
not only a bias in favor of certain facts, definitions, standards, norms, values, or beliefs,
but also a concession of authority and validity: the members accept the jurisdiction of
these facts, norms, etc., over themselves, and over what they do – but also over what they
see – because they are convinced, for reasons that are exempt from doubt, that they merit
their adherence. Thus, the “natural facts of life” are “socially-sanctioned-facts-of-life-in-
society-that-any-bona-fide-member-of-the-society-knows”  (ibid.:  76).  This  means  that
they are not only valid for members directly engaged in the production of an activity, but
for anyone. Adherence to these facts expresses itself in phrases such as “this is how we do
it,” “this is how we usually do it,” “this is how it’s done,” “you can do that,” “you don’t do
that,” “this is how things are normally done, how they ought to be done, or how they
must be done,” etc.
45 Obviously, the adherence in question is not the result of a deliberation on the member’s
part, and most certainly not the result of a critical examination of what Habermas calls
“claims to validity” that are put forward for factual or normative propositions, or that are
laid by traditions. The presuppositions on the basis of which we make sense of situations
that we are experiencing are not, strictly speaking, objects of knowledge or objects of
discourse. As M. Polyani says, “we may be said to dwell in them” (Polyani 1958: 60).
46 The  sense  of  “normality”  thus  appears  as  an  essential  element  of  mediation  in  the
constitution of the behavioral environment which is society. In fact, the determination of
the basis of inference and required action to deal with a situation, to coordinate with
others, to adjust to circumstances, or to compose with the objective conditions of the
environment is precisely based on the “motivated” admission of these “natural facts of
life in society” (life in society viewed “from the inside of society”),  as assumed to be
known and admitted by everyone.
47 The  social  order  that  the  members  of  society  experience  is  therefore  inseparably
cognitive and normative at the same time. The social order, as experienced by the agents,
provides  them with cognitive  resources,  that  is  to  say  at  the  same time with ideas,
conceptions, definitions, beliefs and knowledge (the “common sense knowledge of the
facts  of  social  life”),  and  with  means  to  understand,  interpret,  explain,  justify,  and
describe reality. But cognition is not separated either from normativity or from morality.
If it is true that people refer to “common sense knowledge of the facts of social life” as a
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set  of  “natural  facts  of  life,”  and if  they understand,  interpret,  describe,  explain the
events and situations on the basis of such a reference, it is fair to say there is indeed a
“morality of cognition” (Heritage 1984). Yet, this morality is not only valid for agents who
are carrying out an activity, but also for those who observe it and who are compelled to
recognize it for what it is. In addition to this, common sense knowledge does not separate
facts and values – much to the contrary. In cognition, not only intellectual certainties are
at work, but also moral commitments that attribute value, price and authority to the
“natural facts of life,” to taken for granted definitions of reality, and to the “common
sense knowledge of social structures.”
48 Using a vocabulary essentially borrowed from social phenomenology, Garfinkel expresses
the idea that social agents perceive, feel, think, interpret, reason, and so on, in terms of
an institutionalized social reality:
Common sense knowledge of the facts of social life for the members of the society is
institutionalized  knowledge  of  the  real  world.  Not  only  does  common  sense
knowledge portray a real society for members, but in the manner of self-fulfilling
prophecy  the features  of  the  real  society  are  produced  by  persons’  motivated
compliance with these background expectancies […]. Seen from the person’s point
of  view,  his  commitments  to  motivated  compliance  consist  of  his  grasp  of  and
subscription to the “natural facts of life in society.” (Garfinkel 1967: 53-4)
49 Garfinkel provides various illustrations of this socially instituted character of knowledge
of  the  world.  One  of  these  deals  with  the  use  of  “institutionalized  features  of  the
collectivity as a scheme of interpretation.” In an experiment that simulates the situation
of  asking,  giving  and  receiving  advice,  people  were  invited  to  make  sense  of  the
“yes”/“no” answers (which in fact were determined in advance) given to the questions
that  they  asked.  “Make  sense”  here  essentially  means  to  attribute  a  “reasonable”
character,  to  assign “perceivedly normal  values” while  referring to “institutionalized
features of the collectivity as a scheme of interpretation.” The argument is also more
generally valid for most ordinary interactions:
Subjects  made  specific  reference  to  various  social  structures  in  deciding  the
sensible and warranted character of the adviser’s advice. Such references, however,
were not made to any social structures whatever. In the eyes of the subject, if the
adviser was to know and demonstrate to the subject that he knew what he was
talking about, and if the subject was to consider seriously the adviser’s descriptions
of his circumstances as grounds of the subject’s further thoughts and management
of these circumstances, the subject did not permit the adviser, nor was the subject
willing to entertain, any model of the social structures. References that the subject
supplied,  were  to  social  structures  which  he  treated  as  actually  or  potentially
known in common with the adviser. And then, not to any social structures known
in common, but to normatively valued social structures which the subject accepted
as conditions that his decisions, with respect to his own sensible and realistic grasp
of  his  circumstances  and  the  “good”  character  of  the  adviser’s  advice,  had  to
satisfy. These social structures consisted of normative features of the social system
seen from within, which, for the subject, were definitive of his memberships in the
various collectivities that were referred to. (Ibid.: 92-3)
50 Another enlightening illustration is Garfinkel’s study of the practical accomplishment of
gender in the case of a transsexual, Agnes. In the chapter of Studies in Ethnomethodology
accounting for  this  study,  Garfinkel  describes the functioning of  the “common sense
knowledge of the facts of social life” in relation to the question of gender. From the
common sense perspective, the population is divided into two types of individuals when
viewed from the angle of sexual composition: on one side, natural males and females, on
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the other side, persons who are morally different – the “incompetent, criminal, sick and
sinful” (ibid.: 122). Garfinkel specifies that this is the definition of “a real world of sexed
persons,”  a  world  that  is  viewed as  a  “legitimate  order,”  “as  a  matter  of  objective,
institutionalized facts, i.e. moral facts” (in the sense that these facts give rise to moral,
and not only intellectual, convictions). According to such a definition, to which everyone
is expected to adhere as a matter of course when dealing with others, “the presence in
the environment of sexed objects has the feature of a ‘natural matter of fact’”:
This naturalness  carries  along with it,  as  a  constituent part  of  its  meaning,  the
sense of its being right and correct, i.e.,  morally proper that it be that way […].
Hence the bona fide member of the society, within what he subscribes to as well as
what he expects others to subscribe to as committed beliefs about “natural matters
of fact” regarding distribution of sexed persons in the society, finds the claims of
the sciences like zoology, biology and psychiatry strange. These sciences argue that
decisions about sexuality are problematic matters. […] I have stressed several times
that for the bona fide member “normal” means “in accordance with the mores.”
Sexuality as a natural fact of life means therefore sexuality as a natural and moral
fact of life. (Ibid.: 123-4)
51 There  is  thus,  from  the  perspective  of  ethnomethodology,  not  only  an  immediate
manifestness of the social order and social structures to be found in familiar scenes of
everyday life and in their “social settings” – it is not necessary to wait for them to be
rendered visible by scientific objectification – but also an immediate availability of this
order and these structures as practical resources, for both identification, comprehension
and description of these scenes, and for the structuring of practical accomplishments.
This  immediate  availability  is  in  a  way  conditioned  by  the  specific  filter  of  the
constitutive requirements of common sense knowledge. However, this availability is only
immediate in situations where operations that actively organize behavior are taking
place, which makes it different from that which society shows as an object of discourse or
of scientific observation. It means that society operates, when engaged in such active
operations, as a medium, or more precisely as a purveyor of schemes of interpretation
and organization,  orientations and norms,  models  and standards,  with the instituted
ideas and meanings that are part of it. This availability also shows that society is not to be
distinguished from these operations – hence the validity of the expression that Garfinkel
occasionally used: the “workings of immortal ordinary society.”
 
The Primacy of the Social in Mead’s Writings
52 Mead conceptualized the primacy of  the social  very differently:  he presents  both an
observation and a theoretical construction. An observation: no living organism can exist
alone and isolated from others: “All living organisms are bound up in a general social
environment or situation, in a complex of social interrelations and interactions upon
which their  continued existence depends” (Mead 1934:  228).  The bulk stimulation of
behavior  is  provided  by  reciprocal  actions  of  the  members  of  these  groups.  The
development of the “vital process” of society as organism (as Mead occasionally puts it)
requires  “social  acts”  involving  multiple  individuals,  and  the  organization  of  social
cooperation  brings  into  play  very  different  mechanisms,  depending  on  the  type  of
society. In short, the social process is first of all factual. Any behavior is inevitably social
because it takes place in a context of coexistence, association and interdependence, and
because individual acts are but one phase in a more wider behavior, that of the social
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whole. This means that to be complete, the acts of individuals require the acts of other
individuals. 
53 However, for Mead the primacy of the social is simultaneously a theoretical construction:
it is in the social nature of experience in a group, and in the structure of the social act
that results – a social act which varies depending on the social forms of cooperation and
coordination – that the mechanism which, through communication, enabled the rise of
the higher form of organization of behavior which is the reflective control of behaviors.
This is the mechanism of assuming the attitude of a generalized other:
I have my own doctrine for this social character of experience […] What it amounts
to in a very summary formulation is that society exists in the social nature of its
members, and the social nature of its members exists in their assumption of the
organized attitudes of others who are involved with them in cooperative activities,
and that this assumption of organized attitudes has arisen through communication.
(Mead 1929: 341)
54 The primacy of the social is therefore not only the primacy of the “social act,” but also
the primacy of social and institutional habits, since, as Mead writes, it is in institutions
that individuals “find the organization of their own social responses.” In fact, institutions
essentially are established organizations of responses, or “complexes of social habits.”
Among  society’s  institutions,  language  is  the  most  fundamental  one.  Like  any  other
institution, language can be characterized as an organization of responses or attitudes
that are specific to a society, to the extent that it is a means to produce the different parts
of an integrated social act: 
The significant symbol is nothing but part of the act which serves as gesture to call
out the other part of the process, the response of the other, in the experience of the
form that makes the gesture. […] The symbols as such are simply ways of calling out
responses. They are not bare words, but words that do answer to certain responses;
and when we combine a certain sort of symbols, we inevitably combine a certain set
of responses. (Mead 1934: 269)
55 As we have seen,  Garfinkel  approaches  the  primacy of  the  social  from a  completely
different perspective. While he attributes the same function to institutions, and the same
role to the implantation of the social perspective into behavior in the form of a sense of
normality, Garfinkel’s conception of the primacy of the social is much more durkheimian.
He conceives of sociality as tightly interwoven with morality. (It could also be added that
his description of the self-organization of “social settings” develops a motif which is very
similar to that of pragmatism: the operational contribution of the environment to the
organization of experience.) At the same time, it is the operations and accomplishments
of the members of society that Garfinkel sees as the foundations of the edifice of the
social and moral order.
56 In his early writings, Garfinkel took up Schütz’s question of intersubjectivity as well as his
analysis  of  the  structures  of  the  Lebenswelt:  the  “stability  of  concerted  actions”  is
produced  through  intersubjective  operations  between  the  individuals,  with  the
operations  being  normatively  regulated  and  socially  organized.  In  a  later  phase  he
proposed a different version of the primacy of the social, namely viewed from the angle
of the “social object.”
57 In  the context  of  this  last  point,  too,  a  connection can be made between Mead and
Garfinkel.  Mead  used  and  abused  the  term  “social  object,”  at  times  ascribing  very
different meanings to it.  For Mead, the self is a social object,  partly because it arises
through interaction and because it incorporates the attitudes of others, especially the
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perspective of the group. Institutions such as property are also “social objects,” as are
shared values and meanings, or as are persons. The only instance where Mead uses the
term somewhat more precisely is in his theory of the social act. The social object is the
meaningful whole that controls the execution of a complex act distributed over multiple
agents.  It  is  therefore,  in a  certain way,  the form of  the act  as  a  whole (Mead uses
examples such as team plays or economic exchanges). The form is an entity of order and
meaning. It organizes and binds together the different parts and corresponding roles of
the complete act, thereby also giving a direction to the whole. At the same time, the form
transcends the participants of the act and their individual performances, and gives the
whole a normative and objective character, in part because the form corresponds to an
institution or an instituted practice. Mead says of this “social object” that it has to be
present in the experience of every participant of a social act in order to produce the
proper responses, which are connected to the responses of the others, and to control
their performances. In this sense it has also a structuring effect on the situation. The
modality of its appearance is not clearly stated. In certain instances, the social object
refers to society as a whole: it is the common object generated by the presence of all in
the experience of everyone, the object that ensures social control in a society of selves.
58 Garfinkel’s social object is just as transcendental and objective, and it also controls the
situation  and  conduct  of  individuals,  albeit  in  a  different  manner,  namely  through
normativity and morality – two aspects that Mead rarely speaks of.  It is through the
individuals’ operations and accomplishments, which are supported by legitimate beliefs
as  well  as  habits  and  customs,  that  the  social  object  acquires  the  status  of  being
simultaneously transcendental as well as objective, authoritative, and obligatory.
59 For Garfinkel, the paradigmatic example for the social object is the “formatted queue.”
When lining up in order to wait to gain access to a service, the participants generate,
through their effective conduct and reasoning – finding, taking, and keeping their place
in line, maintaining the direction of the line, advancing, staying at the right distance, etc.
– not only a physically observable order but also a normative environment to which they
submit themselves. They are exteriorizing the normative reference and thereby giving it
an  independent  existence. By  assigning  it  a  transcendental  status,  they  attribute  a
regulatory and obligatory power to an order that they themselves create and make visible
(as well as being accountable, and able to be cited in support of an evaluation, complaint,
incrimination, etc.) through their attitudes and conduct. The constraints of this order are
directly felt by the people who create it. By displaying attitudes and conduct that are in
conformity  to  the  relatively  vague  normative  expectancies  which the  physical  order
generates, the individuals are attesting their conformity to something that they do not
consider as depending on themselves. Nevertheless, they are its very source, but they
identify it  as being exterior to themselves,  and recognize it  as obligatory and having
authority, based on legitimacy or moral desirability. On the other hand, it is through this
social object that, on the basis of established and socially approved practices, they are
able to produce things together, and to control their actions and contributions to the
whole.  It  is  the  prime example  of  what  Garfinkel  (2002)  calls  a  “Durkheimian social
object”:
The social object seems to stand above, or to be greater than, the actions of its
production cohort. […] And that object is a moral object through and through; it is
right and proper that the object – the formatted queue, for example – is the way
that it is. It is a moral fact of life and the actions of its local production cohort are
moral or immoral actions, like butting-in-line […]. The actions of a social object’s
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production  cohort  are  constrained  by  the  object  that  that  cohort  is  itself
accountably producing. (Livingston 1987: 82)
 
To Conclude
60 Ethnomethodology has much surpassed Mead’s intuitions on a number of points, and,
from the point of view of the social sciences, fleshed them out in a much more satisfying
manner. Is this a reason to send Mead’s works to the shelves of second-hand bookstores?
Can his work still guide our inquiries? Obviously, it all depends on what we are looking
for. If, for example, we want to retrace the natural history of the mind, communication or
human society, we will find in Mead’s works a wide spectrum of stimulating conjectures
that will fuel our investigations. The same is true when trying to fend off the subjectivist
narrowing-down of the concept of experience in modernity as recalled by R. Koselleck
(1988). 
61 In relation to ethnomethodology, Mead’s argument carries a potential that deserves to be
underlined. The functioning of common sense under the aspect of normality, as Garfinkel
has described it, seems to be immune to all innovation, contestation or transformation: it
never transcends the order of the membership collectivity. It is a decidedly conservative
version of common sense, and quite opposed to the very spirit of a democratic society, if
the latter is understood as opening up the possibility of never-ending questioning and as
the removal of the landmarks of certainty. Mead’s common sense is not closed in this
way; the common perspective introduced in conduct, in order to organize and control it,
is not limited to a particular group or collective. This common perspective is by definition
more  open  to  a  more  universal  generality,  built  on  the  intersecting  of  unrealized
possibilities in the present order:
A human being is a member of a community and is thereby an expression of its
customs and the carrier of its values. These customs appear in the individual as
habits, and the values appear as his goods, and these habits and goods come into
conflict with each other. Out of the conflict arise in human social experience the
meanings of things and the rational solution of the conflicts. The rational solution
of the conflicts, however, calls for the reconstruction of both habits and values, and
this involves transcending the order of the community. A hypothetically different
order suggests itself and becomes the end in conduct. It is a social end and must
appeal to others in the community. In logical terms there is established a universe
of discourse which transcends the specific order within which the members of the
community may, in a specific conflict, place themselves outside of the community
order as it exists, and agree upon changed habits of action and a restatement of
values. (Mead 1930b: 404)
62 Mead  thus  presents  us  with  an  analytical  hold  on  the  political  dimension  of  social
experience that ethnomethodology has never managed to provide.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BENNETT M. R. & P. M. S. HACKER, (2003), Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Oxford, Blackwell.
Towards a Social Externalism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-2 | 2011
17
BLUMER H., (1967), Symbolic Interactionism. Perspective and Method, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.
BUTTON G. (ed.), (1991), Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
CANIGLIA E. & A. SPREFICO (eds), (2011), “L’ethnomethodologia oggi: prospettive e problem,” 
Quaderni di Teoria Sociale 11, 11-258.
COOK G. A., (1993), George Herbert Mead. The Making of a Social pragmatist, Urbana, University of
Illinois Press.
COULTER J., (1989), Mind in Action, Cambridge, Polity Press.
EMIRBAYER M. & D. W. MAYNARD, (2011), “Pragmatism and Ethnomethodology,” Qualitative Sociology
, 34 (1), 221-61.
GARFINKEL H., (1963), “A Conception of, and Experiments with, “Trust” as a Condition of Stable
Concerted Actions,” in O. J. Harvey (ed.), Motivation and Social Interaction, New York, Ronald Press,
187-38.
GARFINKEL H., (1967), Studies in Ethnomethodology, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall.
GARFINKEL H., (2002), Ethnomethodology’s Program. Working Out Durkheim’s Aphorism, Lanham,
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
HERITAGE J., (1984), Garfinkel & Ethnomethodology, Cambridge, Polity Press.
JOAS H., (1996), The Creativity of Action, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
KOSELLECK R., (1988), “Erfahrungswandel und Methodenwechsel,” in Meier C. & Rüsen J. (eds), 
Historische Methode, Munich, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 13-61.
LIVINGSTON E., (1987), Making Sense of Ethnomethodology, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
LIVINGSTON E., (2008), “Context and Detail in Studies of the Witnessable Social Order: Puzzles,
Maps, Checkers and Geometry,” Journal of Pragmatics 40, 840-62.
LYNCH M., (1993), Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
MEAD G. H., (1927), “The objective Reality of Perspectives,” in A. Reck (ed.), G. H. Mead, Selected
Writings, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 306-19.
MEAD G. H., (1929), “A Pragmatic Theory of Truth,” in A. Reck, 320-44.
MEAD G. H., (1930a), “Cooley’s Contribution to American Thought,” American Journal of Sociology,
XXXV (5), 693-706.
MEAD G. H., (1930b), “Philanthropy from the Point of View of Ethics,” in A. Reck, 392-407.
MEAD G. H., (1932), The Philosophy of the Present, Chicago, Open Court Pub. Company.
MEAD G. H., (1934), Mind, Self and Society from the Point of View of a Social Behaviorist, Chicago, The
University of Chicago Press.
MEAD G. H., (1938), The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
POLANYI M., (1958), Personal Knowledge, London, Routledge.
QUÉRÉ L. & C. TERZI, (2011), “Some Features of Pragmatist Thought Still Remain Insufficiently
Explored in Ethnomethodology,” Qualitative Sociology, 34 (1), 271-5.
Towards a Social Externalism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-2 | 2011
18
RAWLS A. W., (2002), “Editor’s introduction,” in H. Garfinkel, Ethnomethodology’s Program. Working
Out Durkheim’s Aphorism, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1-64.
RAWLS A. W., (2011), “Garfinkel, Ethnomethodlogy and the Defining Questions of pragmatism,” 
Qualitative Sociology, 34 (1), 277-82.
WATSON R. & J. COULTER, (2008) “The Debate over Cognitivism,” Theory, Culture & Society, 25 (2),
1-18.
NOTES
1. On the current state of ethnomethodology, see Livingston 2008; also the dossier published by
Enrico Caniglia & Andrea Spreafico in Quaderni di Teoria Soziale 11, 2011. On Garfinkel’s reading of
the Pragmatists, see Rawls 2002; Emirbayer & Maynard 2011; Quéré & Terzi 2011; Rawls 2011. For
a general  overview of  ethnomethodology,  see,  among others,  Heritage 1984;  Livingston 1987;
Button 1991; Lynch 1993.
ABSTRACTS
Ethnomethodologists  have very  often distorted G. H. Mead’s  works,  partly  because  they have
read  them  through  H. Blumer’s  interpretations.  Therefore  they  have  undervalued  many
similarities  existing  between  Mead’s  and  Garfinkel’s  thoughts.  Of  course  there  are  lots  of
ambiguities  and  problems  in  Mead’s  writings,  and  ethomethodologists  are  right  when  they
criticize them. But they are wrong when they misread Mead. This paper examines two points.
The first one is one about which Mead has often been misread: his use of the internal-exernal
distinction with regard to mind and action. This use doesn’t aim at maintaining a pychological
interiority,  but  at  grasping  motricity  as  a  kind  of  intentionality.  The  second  point  is  about
Garfinkel’s  respecification  of  one  of  Mead’s  main  leitmotiv:  “taking  the  attitude  of  the
generalized other.” Garfinkel’s respecification is done in A. Schütz’s terms : the attitude of the
generalized other is internal to the “attitude of everyday life,” and the generalized other takes
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